OwlEye

Memorandum on Terror

[Note: This is a paper in response to a paper question for a class as part of the MPA program at Queen's University. The memorandum is entirely fictional and does not represent Canadian government policy in any way. The question being answered is:
One of the most difficult issues to come to grips with is the “root causes” of terrorism. Some consider the whole idea of causes as a cop-out. Former Prime Minister Mulroney said that the root cause of terrorism is terrorists. Prime Minister Chrétien maintained, on the other hand, that the inexorable encroachment of the West, especially the US, on others was bound to produce “push-back”. The world’s response to terrorism has tended to focus on “hard” instruments, i.e., the military, intelligence services and the public security agencies. Effective “soft” responses have lagged behind, allowing conditions that incubate terrorists to persist. Diverse factors are in play, ranging from poverty and falling standards of living in the Muslim world, to resentment of Western values, culture and power, to extremist religious ideologies, to failing and failed states, to repressive regimes, to unresolved conflicts, particularly those involving Muslim populations, to U S foreign policy in the Middle East, especially in Iraq and the US’s apparent unconditional support for Israel. Terrorism recruitment efforts benefit from behaviour that can be portrayed as discriminatory, anti-Muslim or embodying double standards. The US has tended to see terrorism as monolithic: a terrorist is a terrorist is a terrorist, with the unintended consequence of aligning itself with countries that it might rather not have as allies, for example the Russians as they brutalize the Chechens and the Chinese as they repress the Uighurs, etc. Such a monolithic approach also makes it more difficult to shape policies that depend for their success on disaggregation, differentiation and dealing with root causes. Some experts are counseling the Minister to speak openly and frankly about the issues’ complexity and to advocate greater attention to root causes. The Minister is worried that doing so might make him appear naive and might irritate senior people in Washington. He has asked for your advice on what to do. What would you advise him to do in the circumstances?]

XXXXXX XXXXXXX
Strategic Policy Division
613-123-7645

UNCLASSIFIED

May 26, 2006

Action Memorandum for:
The Minister of Foreign Affairs

ISSUE: Whether and how the Minister should incorporate the consideration and discussion of the ‘root causes’ of terrorism into its public communications

RECOMMENDATIONS:

It is recommended that the Minister of Foreign Affairs:

1. Begin to discuss the root causes of terror when speaking internationally and dealing with foreign governments, regardless of the position that our allies take on the validity of such topics.
   
   
2. Encourage and facilitate research into the causes of terrorism around the world in order to gain a deeper understanding of those factors. This research would then be able to provide a foundation for better understanding how to conduct counter-terror campaigns and as a basis for international discussions on the subject.
   
   
3. Continue to support military solutions against existing terrorist organizations both in words and actions, despite the incorporation of root causes into discussions. Such considerations cannot be allowed to eclipse the hard-power component of counter-terrorism discourse, but instead should supplement the overall discussion.
   
   BACKGROUND:

4. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the declaration of the global ‘War on Terror,’ the United States has focused its energies on the defeat and destruction of terrorist organizations worldwide. The American public, led by their government, quickly concluded that the foundation for terrorist activities was a basic hatred of their fundamental liberties.[1] This allowed for swift and decisive military action against Afghanistan, but the absolute characterization of all terrorists, regardless of their background and motivation, as evil and immoral has prevented any differentiation between terror organizations or attempts to understand the underlying causes of terrorism. This has led to the belief that the cause of terrorism is terrorists, and that the only solution is their capture or death. This hard-power approach is encapsulated in the ‘War on Terror.’
   
   
5. There has been some acknowledgement by the United States that other factors must be addressed in order to ultimately prevail against terrorism, specifically surrounding poverty issues and failed states.[2] An attempt to encourage economic development and ameliorate the living conditions of disenfranchised people around the world has become the second prong of the American anti-terror strategy.[3] Aside from poverty, any attempt to explain or consider other factors in the development of terror has been characterized as naïve or dismissed outright by the American government. Former Prime Minister Jean Chretien’s contention that western encroachment in the Middle East was at least partially responsible for the response was met with hostility from the White House and helped sour the Canadian-American bilateral relationship.
   
   
6. Academia has generally accepted this dual conception of terrorism, with the bulk of research in the area focused on the military capabilities and strategies of terrorists, rather than on their motivations and goals.[4] However, recent research has begun to indicate that both the military and anti-poverty approaches to counterterrorism may be less effective than previously thought and have begun to suggest other strategies that may be more successful in addressing and weakening the foundations of support for terrorism, as well as directly countering the effectiveness and capabilities of terrorist groups.[5]
   
   
7. The logic of the War on Terror and its conception of terrorism compels the United States to engage militarily with terrorists in an attempt to absolutely defeat them.[6] Unfortunately, history suggests that a purely military response may not just be ineffective in defeating terrorism, but may in fact prolong the conflict, as seen in Chechnya, Israel-Palestine and Sri Lanka, due to the entrenchment of hatred on both sides. Furthermore, the War on Terror has encouraged allies in order to move militarily against terrorists, and legitimized the repression of internal dissent in countries such as Russia/Chechnya, Uzbekistan, China, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Egypt.[7] One of the recent conclusions proposed by research is that it is repressive authoritarian states, not failed states, which foster terrorist movements around the world, as well as adding credibility to the claim of American double-standards around the world.[8] A more nuanced understanding of terrorism may suggest that such alliances of convenience are in fact counterproductive, and it is in the interests of both the United States and Canada to discuss and confirm this one way or another as early as possible.
   
   
8. It is also becoming increasingly evident that focusing the soft-power approach on poverty reduction may also be less effective than a holistic consideration of a broad set of factors that contribute to terrorism. Research has begun to indicate that the assumed link between poverty and terrorism is much weaker than previously thought. Recent studies of Hezbollah and Palestinian resistance groups suggest that terrorists are more likely to have higher educational and income levels than the average, with support for resistance enjoying greater support amongst the more affluent members of society.[9] These studies have gone so far as to argue that education and income may be positively correlated with membership in terrorist organizations. As such, a poverty reduction strategy that does not address the other causes of terrorism, such as the preponderance of Islamist education in the madresas, may actually have the potential to increase terrorism.[10]
   
   CONSIDERATIONS:
   
   
9. Terrorism is not merely a threat to American security; it is also a Canadian concern, especially with Canadian troops active in Afghanistan. This means that if Canada identifies ways to address terrorism and improve our security, it is important that they be pursued. Research has indicated a number of alternative causes of terrorism, most of which would suggest an alternative response to military force. It would be contrary to our national interest not to at least explore these ideas and to challenge whether the current global approach is the most appropriate means to combat terror.
   
   
10. This discussion must be balanced against one of the other pillars of Canadian national security, the strength and reliability of our alliance with the United States. It is clear that the American government will be annoyed by such considerations, especially if they perceive it to undermine their position and legitimacy.[11] As such, Canada must take care to consider the subject in a manner that will minimize the negative response while still being able to discuss these ideas fully.
    
    
11. This will require that Canada continues to fully support the military aspect of counterterrorism activities, and not allow the discussion of root causes to be interpreted as a sign of weakness by the Bush Administration. Furthermore, such a discussion cannot replace our current discourse, but must rather supplement it. Without undermining the legitimacy of the discussion, the need to ensure that such discussions not be interpreted as weak or anti-American, it may need to avoid root causes that may be seen as attacks on the United States. This would include criticisms of American foreign policy and its impact on the perceptions of Muslim populations, and should instead focus on the more positive steps that can be taken to address root causes, such as addressing frustrated expectations and ensuring that the benefits of globalization are evenly spread throughout the world. Broaching the more sensitive topics would be more appropriate in private, or left until such discourse achieves broader legitimacy.
    
    
12. Regardless of current belief, research demonstrates that terrorists are not psychopathic or sociopathic.[12] In dealing with terrorism, we are facing a rational opponent which has chosen to use suicide terrorism as its preferred tactic.[13] It has been able to develop recruiting methods that allow it to convince otherwise educated and intelligent young men and women to kill themselves for a cause.[14] The only way to win the war on terrorism is not to eliminate the use of terror, as that is impossible, but instead eliminate the ability for organizations such as al-Qaeda to threaten us, which is possible. This requires an approach which targets the conditions which allow organizations such as al-Qaeda to exist, not just to kill as many terrorists as possible. This is an important distinction: there do not seem to be specific conditions that produce terrorists, as if there were, suicide terrorism would be much more widespread. Instead, it is necessary to target the conditions that allow for the success of terrorist organizations. We will not defeat terrorism relying solely on military strength, which may even exacerbate the conflict. A resolution to this conflict can only come through wining the battle of ideas.[15] An understanding that these individuals are rational provides hope that a solution is possible, but undermines the ability to use military force. As such, our approach to this discussion must be cautious and measured.
    
    
13. The type of policy approach that research has indicated might be effective could include:[16]
    
    
1. increased support for education projects in high-risk nations, specifically designed to challenge the monopoly over socialization enjoyed by the madresas
   
   
2. addressing the population pressures of third world nations, which, if left unchecked, will produce increasingly large youth populations in high-risk nations whose current standard of living will only be able to be maintained through very high economic growth rates, which are unlikely
   
   
3. increased public advocacy and support for moderate Muslim voices, as well as an attempt to foster greater understanding and respect for Islam domestically
   
   
4. a greater focus on the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, a move which may necessitate broader international participation beyond just the current group of four
   
   
5. other policies which have been, and will continue to be, identified by research
   
   
14. Taken together, this suggests that Canada should begin to publicly discuss the ‘root causes’ of terrorism, but to do so in a manner which is subtle and measured, designed as a balance between our interest in fully exploring these issues and ensuring that our response is as complete and effective as possible, while not angering our American allies any more than is necessary. If we are able to effectively find this balance, our ability to cope with the current terrorist threat may be significantly improved, and will have the side-effect of increasing our credibility throughout the Muslim world, through an honest attempt to understand and respond to their grievances.[17] By approaching them as partners in finding a solution to extreme Islamists as opposed to members of a barbaric and backward religion, we may be able to recapture our position as an effective and trusted international mediator. It is in Canada’s national interest, as well as in line with our values, to begin to incorporate such ideas into international discourse, and we should begin immediately.
    
    RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS:
    
    
15. Some initial funding will be necessary to support research into the root causes of terrorism. Once such research gains greater acceptance in the academic community, its momentum should limit the amount of long-term funding that would be required.
    
    COMMUNICATIONS IMPLICATIONS:
    
    
16. There may be opposition to this new strategy from the American administration, politicians and the public, who may see Canada as soft on terrorism. This could have consequences for a variety of Canadian interests, especially if this perception is reinforced in Congress.
    
    COMMUNICATIONS ACTIONS:
    
    
17. Perceptions of weakness can be addressed by a clear explanation of the purpose behind the choice to begin this discussion and how it can be used to improve and assist the war on terror.
    
    
18. Other than countering charges of weakness, the only actions that are required are the inclusion of ‘root causes’ into the language and reasoning of press releases, speeches and other communications activities.

PARLIAMENTARY IMPLICATIONS:

NIL

posted by MattyJ @ 8:33 PM